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ABSTRACT
In SmithKline v. Apotex, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit invalidated the
main patent on Paxil as inherently anticipated. In doing so, the court over-stepped the
bounds of appellate review, and broadened the scope of the inherent anticipation doctrine
to include chemical structures that are not measurably produced by strict practice of the
prior art. This holding does not comport with well-settled precedent and could have dire
consequences for the patentability of many chemical structures. A more equitable
invalidity analysis would require a chemical structure to derive directly from a disclosed
reaction in order to be anticipated; in all other cases, the chemical structure must be
proven obvious.

Copyright © 2006 The John Marshall Law School

Cite as Bryan William Jones, Comment, SmithKline v. Apotex:
Broadeningthe Scope of InherentAnticipation and Its Impact on the
Patentabilityof ChemicalStructures,5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 456 (2006).

SMITHKLINE v. APOTEX. BROADENING THE SCOPE OF INHERENT
ANTICIPATION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE PATENTABILITY OF CHEMICAL
STRUCTURES
BRYAN WILLIAM JONES*

INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of inherent anticipation postulates that everything consistently
resulting from the practicing of prior art is anticipated, regardless of whether such
result was explicitly disclosed.1 In order to establish inherent anticipation, positive
evidence emanating directly from practice of the prior art must disclose the presence
of the anticipated subject matter. 2 Moreover, production of the anticipated subject
matter must be a necessary consequence of the prior art. 3
"An accidental
4
anticipation."
an
constitute
not
does
process
or
a
product
of
achievement
Despite these well-settled principles, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit ("Federal Circuit") has recently expanded inherency beyond the traditional
bounds.
In SmithKline v. Apotex, the Federal Circuit applied the inherent
anticipation doctrine to invalidate a patent on a novel three-dimensional chemical
structure despite the fact that it was not measurably produced through strict practice
of the prior art.5 This case threatens the patentability of any chemical structure.
Patents are designed to strike a balance between increasing the store of public
knowledge and encouraging innovation. 6 The holding in SmithKline indicates that
* J.D. Candidate, May 2007, The John Marshall Law School. B.S., Molecular Genetics, Mar.
1999, The Ohio State University. M.S., Neurobiology and Physiology, Dec. 2003, Northwestern
University. The author would like to thank his friends and family for their love and support. He
would also like to acknowledge his mentors, Dr. Matthew Fenton and Dr. William Klein, and thank
them for their invaluable professional advice.
1 1-3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3.03; see also Schering Corp. v. Geneva
Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d. 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Brassica Prot. Prods LLC v. Sunrise Farms (in
re Cruciferous Sprout Litig), 301 F.3d 1343, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2002); MEHL/Biophile Int'l Corp. v.
Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
2 See goenerally In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (holding that theoretical evidence
establishing production of a radioactive isotope was insufficient to establish anticipation).
Sehering 339 F.3d. at 1377; MEHLBiophile, 192 F.3d at 1366.
4 CHISUM, supra note 1, § 3.03.
5 Smith~line Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005), reversing,
247 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (N.D. Ill. 2003). "This court's holding today merely precludes patent protection
for the bare compound PHC hemihydrate as claimed in claim 1." Id. Process claims, purification
claims, and utilization claims are unaffected. Id. (citing Schering 339 F.3d at 1381).
6 Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378 (1945) (noting that "[Congress] gave to the
inventor limited opportunity to gather material rewards for his invention and secured to the public
the benefits of full knowledge of the invention and the right to use it upon the expiration of the
patent"); Omega Eng'g Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (reasoning that the
Federal Circuit requires a clear disavowal of claim scope in order to "balance the importance of
public notice and the right of patentees to seek broad patent coverage"); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
8 ("[Congress has the power] to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for
limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries"); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v.
Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453-54 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that "the real meaning of'prior
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the Federal Circuit has tried to strike this balance in the chemical arts by deeming
any undescribed chemical structure that derives from production of a prior art
structure anticipated, regardless of the method of derivation. However, this opens
the door to invalidating patents on chemical and pharmaceutical structures through
anticipation based solely on scientific speculation. Inventions should not be excluded
from patent protection on such a tenuous basis.
This comment will analyze the rationale and implications of the inherent
anticipation doctrine as applied in SmithKline. First, the concepts of obviousness,
anticipation, and inherency will be reviewed, and the facts underlying SmithKine
will be introduced. Next, the Federal Circuit's decision in SmithKline will be
discussed and criticized. Finally, SmithKline' implications will be analyzed and an
alternate rubric for analyzing similar situations will be suggested.

I.BACKGROUND

At its core, patent protection rests on a quid pro quo between the inventor and
society. 7 The inventor agrees to disclose something that is useful in exchange for the
limited right to exclude others from making, using, offering to sell, or selling the
innovation.8 One consideration in this exchange requires the inventor to prove that
her invention is novel and non-obvious. 9 Simply put, disclosure of something that
does not increase society's store of knowledge does not warrant granting monopoly
protection to the discloser. 10 To this end, Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and
103.11 Any disclosure that falls within the purview of § 102 lacks novelty and is
12
deemed "anticipated" by the prior art, while one that falls within § 103 is "obvious."
First, the standards of patentability under these statutes will be introduced. Then,
the facts and the procedural history underlying SmithKine will be discussed.

art' . .. is knowledge that is available, including what would be obvious from it, at a given time, to a
person of ordinary skill in the art.").
7 E.g., Lizardtech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
8 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
9 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000).
10Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989).
Sections 102(a) and (b) operate in tandem to exclude from consideration for patent
protection knowledge that is already available to the public. They express a
congressional determination that the creation of a monopoly in such information
would not only serve no socially useful purpose, but would in fact injure the public
by removing existing knowledge from public use.

Id.
11(2000).
12 See id.; WILLIAM H. FRANCIS & ROBERT C. COLLINS, 5 CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT
LAW 183-86 (West 2002).
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A. Obviousness,Anticipation, and Inherency

1. Obviousness
Section 103 was enacted to address situations where the claimed invention is not
literally identical to the prior art, but the prior art nonetheless makes the claimed
subject matter obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art. 13 In litigation, an
obviousness analysis consists of two steps: determining the scope of the patent claim
and determining the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior
art. 14
First, the scope of the patent claim is determined. A patent claim informs the
public of the limits of the invention. 15 In order to properly construe the claims, a
court must determine what the claims would mean to a person of ordinary skill in the
16
art in light of the entire record.
Second, the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art
must be compared through the lens of one with ordinary skill in the art.17 The
invention is deemed obvious if this comparison shows (1) that the claimed subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious to such a person at the time ofinvention,
and (2) the prior art would enable her to produce the subject matter.18 Courts
consider the scope and content of the prior art, the level of ordinary skill in the art,
and the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art. 19 Also,
secondary considerations, such as "commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs,
20
[and] failure of others," may be used to help arrive at such a conclusion.
13 See Gillette Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 919 F.2d 720, 724 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Fine,
837 F.2d 1071, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re Nilssen, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 9796 *1-2 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
14Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). "Under § 103, the scope and content of the
prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be
ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved." Id. "Against this
background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined." Id.
15Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931) (noting that "Whe [patent] statute
requires the patentee ... to inform the public during the life of the patent of the limits of the
monopoly asserted, so that it may be known which features may be safely used or manufactured
without a license and which may not"); Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47, 57
(1938) (noting that "[t]he object of the [patent statute] is to require the patentee to describe his
invention so that others may construct and use it after the expiration of the patent").
16Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979-80 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),
afed, 516 U.S. 1007 (1996). Claims are interpreted "in view of the specification ... [for which] the
description may act as a sort of dictionary, which explains the inventions and may define terms used
in the claims." Id. at 979. The patent's prosecution history should be included in this analysis. Id.
at 980. See alsoVitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
17

Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.

18 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000); In re Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (noting that, "it
is necessary to ascertain whether or not the reference teachings would appear sufficient for one of
ordinary skill in the relevant art having the references before him to make the proposed
substitution, combination, or other modification").
19 Graham,383 U.S. at 17.
20 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18 (noting that "such secondary considerations ... might be utilized
to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origins of the subject matter sought to be
patented"); In re Lintner, 458 F.2d at 1015 (noting that "unexpectedly superior properties or
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Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co. provides a good example of finding
non-obviousness due to secondary considerations. 21 In Eibel Process, the Supreme
Court held that an alteration in the pitch of a certain wire in a paper-making
machine was a patentable invention because it increased the speed at which the
paper could be made despite the fact that other references suggested increasing the
pitch of the same wire. 22 According to the Court, this alteration was a patentable
discovery because Eibel's patent was aimed increasing the speed of production, which
was important to the art and distinct from the aims of the prior art. 23 As the Court
noted, "[tihe fact that in a decade of an eager quest for the higher speeds this
important chain of circumstances had escaped observation ... leaves no doubt ...
that what [Eibel] saw and did was not obvious." 24 This holding means that a patent

can be non-obvious even though prior art suggests a similar improvement when the
effect of the alteration itself was not suggested by the prior art.

2. Anticipation and Inherency
Anticipation is similar to obviousness but with important distinctions. Whereas
a patent claim can be obvious even when it differs from the prior art, a claim is
anticipated only when it is identical to a prior art disclosure. 25 In order to be
anticipated, every element of a claim must be present in a single prior art reference
and set forth in an identical manner. 26 Although trial courts have found anticipation
where the claim and the prior art were "substantially" the same, the Federal Circuit
and the Supreme Court have repeatedly held that even a slight change defeats
anticipation. 27 While a prior art reference most obviously anticipates a claim when it
28
expressly discloses every element of the claim, such explicitness is not required.
Rather, a piece of prior art is anticipatory if it discloses every limitation of the claim
either expressly or inherently.29 Any result that is "[a] necessary consequence of

advantages as compared to prior art" may be evidence of nonobviousness); In re Papesch, 315 F.2d
381, 387-88 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (holding that a chemical compound that was structurally similar to a
prior art compound was nonetheless nonobvious because it possessed unexpected anti-inflammatory

properties); In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 682 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (holding that properties of chemical
homologs should be considered in determining obviousness).
21 Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923).
22

Id. at 67.

23 d
2 Id.

25 E.g., Gechter v. Davidson, 116 F.3d 1454, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that "[e]very
limitation of a claim must identically appear in a single prior art reference to anticipate the claim.").
26 Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Dart Industries, Inc., 726 F.2d 724, 726-27 (Fed. Cir.
1984); CHISUM, supranote 1, § 3.02 [1][a].
27 CHISUM, supra note 1, § 3.02 [1][a]&[b] (citing Butler v. Helms 550 F.2d 954, 193 (4th Cir.
1977) (noting "a merely extraneous structural feature recited in a claim ...

should not prevent

invalidity for anticipation"); Eibel Process, 261 U.S. at 67 (holding that a change in the angle of one
component of a paper-making apparatus was sufficient to make it a patentable invention); Geebter,

116 F.3d at 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that "[e]very limitation of a claim must identically appear
in a single prior art reference to anticipate the claim.").
28 Glaxo
29 Id.

Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

[5:456 2006]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

what was deliberately intended" is inherently anticipated.3 0 However, the limits of
necessary consequences of prior art are not entirely clear. 31 One line of cases in the
Federal Circuit indicates that the inherent property must be recognizable to one
skilled in the art in order to be inherently anticipated. 32 A second line indicates that
prior art anticipates any natural consequence of its practice, regardless of whether it
33
was recognizable to one of ordinary skill in the art.
This split was ostensibly resolved in Sobering v. Geneva.3 4 Schering held that a
drug patent inherently anticipated one of the drug's metabolites, even though the
identity of the metabolite was unknown when the patent issued. 35 The metabolite
was produced as a natural consequence of ingesting pills containing the prior art
molecule. 36 In this respect, the Sohering court extended the concept of necessary
consequences to applications of prior art beyond those explicitly outlined in the
reference. The court rejected any argument that such consequences needed to be
appreciable in order to be inherently anticipated. 37 In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.
Apotex Corp., this iteration of inherent anticipation was applied to invalidate a
patent on a chemical compound related to the prior art compound, but not
measurably produced by the method outlined in the prior art. 38

B. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.
1. Facts
In the late 1970s, a company named Ferrosan developed and patented the anti30 CHISUM, supranote 1, § 3.03(1).

31 See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Pfizer, Inc. v.
Mylan Labs., Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27450, *11 (W.D. Pa. 2005); Harvest Techs. Corp. v.
Cytomedix, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18003, *27 (D. Mass. 2004). See also Cynthia Chen,
Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Clarificationof the InherentAnticiation Doctrine
and Its Implications,20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 95, 99-104 (2005).
32 Cont'l Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Corp. 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that
"evidence must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is ncessarilypresnnt... and that it
would be so recognizedbypersons ofordinaryskill.") (emphasis added); In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996,
998-99 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (holding that practice of prior art that led to production of a radioactive
isotope "in such minuscule amounts and under such conditions that its presence was undetectable"
did not anticipated the isotope); Glaxo, 52 F.3d at 1047 (interpreting anticipation to require every
limitation of the claim to be "appreciated by one of ordinary skill in the art").
3 E.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In invalidating a
claim for an explosive composition with "sufficient aeration" as the only part of the claim
distinguishing it from prior art, the court noted that "artisans of ordinary skill may not recognize
the inherent characteristics or functioning of prior art." Id. at 1345, 47. "However, the discovery of
a previously unappreciated property of a prior art composition ... does not render the old
composition patentably new to the discoverer." Id. at 1347.
34 Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d. 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
'35Id. at 1380. Note that the drug in question in this case is lortadine (better known as
Claritin) and that the identified metabolite is the "active circulating metabolite" of lortadine. Chen,
supra note 31, at 104-05.
36 Schering, 339 F.3d at 1380 (noting that "ingesting lortadine would necessarily metabolize
that compound to [the metabolite in the anticipated claim]").
37Id. at 1377-78.
38 Smithline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1343-46 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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depressant compound paroxetine ("Ferrosan patent"). 39
As Ferrosan had no
experience in producing pharmaceuticals, it granted a license to SmithKline to bring
40
paroxetine to market.
When an manufacturer produces a drug in pill form, the manufacturer typically
converts a pharmaceutically active compound into its salt. 41 While the Ferrosan
patent disclosed a method of making a paroxetine maleate salt, a hydrochloride salt
is generally preferred. 42 Through some difficulty, Ferrosan was able to produce a
paroxetine hydrochloride salt ("PHC"), although this procedure was not disclosed by
43
the Ferrosan patent.
Initial tests indicated that PHC produced in this manner was anhydrous,
meaning the crystalline structure did not contain bound water. 44
This
anhydrousness made production of PHC in bulk extremely difficult because the PHC
had a propensity to absorb atmospheric water. 45 As a result, SmithKline failed to
find a suitable production method under the Ferrosan patent, which was approaching
its expiration date. 46
This failure was an enormous concern because FDA
requirements already greatly reduce the effective time of exclusive use of patented
47
technologies.
SmithKline sought to remedy the situation by experimenting with different
production methods.48 In the course of doing so, a SmithKline chemist observed a
novel crystalline form of PHC, PHC hemihydrate. 49 The PHC hemihydrate solvate
was more stable than the anhydrous form, making it much easier to package and
preserve. 50 Recognizing the economic potential of this form of PHC, SmithKline
patented PHC hemihydrate ("SmithKline patent").51 SmithKline eventually switched
52
focus to developing a drug under the SmithKline patent, now known as Paxil.
PHC hemihydrate had a peculiar property. Once the hemihydrate was produced
in a lab, the anhydrate form could no longer be produced; rather, procedures that
53
formerly lead to anhydrate production would now lead to hemihydrate production.
Moreover, SmithKline detected hemihydrate in a few PHC batches from a previous
manufacturing cycle that had yielded only anhydrate. 54 SmithKline explained these
observations by a phenomenon called seeding. Seeding occurs when a crystal
31 U.S. Patent No. 4,007,196 (filed July 23, 1975) (claiming "[paroxetine] and a salt thereof
with a pharmaceutically acceptable acid").
40 Smithline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1015 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
41 Id.
42 Id.

43 Id. at 1016.
44 Id. at 1017. In contrast, a hemihydrous crystal structure contains one molecule of water for
every two molecules of the crystalline molecule. Id.
45 Id.

46;_d.
47 Id.

48 Id. at 1016.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1017.

51 U.S. Patent No. 4,721,723 (filed Oct. 23, 1986). The filing claimed, "[c]rystalline paroxetine
hydrochloride hemihydrate" (claim 1) and "[c]rystalline paroxetine hydrochloride hemihydrate in
substantially pure form" (claim 2). Id.
52 SmithIline, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1018.
53 -d. at 1021.

54 Id. at 1021-22.
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structure becomes contaminated with small amounts of a similar, but more stable,
form of the crystal. 55 The less stable form of the crystal then spontaneously converts
to the more stable form. 56 Therefore, if the anhydrous form becomes contaminated
with the more stable hemihydrous seeds, the anhydrous form will rapidly convert to
hemihydrate. This seeding theory formed the basis of the infringement claim in
SmithKline.

2. CourtProeeedings
As the Ferrosan patent approached its expiration date, Apotex, a generic drug
manufacturer, sought approval from the FDA to begin marketing a PHC anhydrousbased pharmaceutical. 57 In response, SmithKline initiated an infringement action
against Apotex.5 8 SmithKline theorized that if one produced the anhydrous form
long enough in an industrial setting, the production facilities would inevitably
become seeded with hemihydrate. 59 This seeding would make future production of
anhydrate impossible because it would convert to hemihydrate, thereby infringing
the SmithKline patent. 60 Apotex asserted that the Ferrosan patent inherently
anticipated the SmithKline patent. 61 It theorized that hemihydrate is always present
when PHC is produced, although it can remain undetectable for a long period of
time. 62 Therefore, the Ferrosan patent inherently anticipated hemihydrate because
it disclosed a method for producing it, albeit in undetectable amounts.
The district court conceded that the Apotex scenario is likely. 63 However, the
court declined to invalidate the SmithKline patent because Apotex failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that production of pure PHC anhydrate inevitably
leads to production of PHC hemihydrate. 64 The district court was particularly
swayed by the significant debate amongst scientists over the origin of different
crystal structures. 65 Despite this, the district court ultimately rejected SmithKline's
infringement action by construing the SmithKline patent to cover only "commercially
significant quantities of hemihydrate." 66 Therefore, the SmithKline patent was held

55Id. at 1019-20.
56 Id. at 1020.
57 Id. at 1023. The Hatch-Waxman Act allows generic manufacturers to eschew formal FDA
safety requirements if it can show that its generic is a bioequivalent of a previously approved drug.
Id. at 1018. To this end, generic manufacturers must file an Abbreviated New Drug Application
("ANDA"), which discloses bio-equivalents to the product. Id. Apotex's ANDA disclosed the active
ingredient of its product as PHC anhydrate, which it claimed as bioequivalent to the PHC
hemihydrate disclosed in the Smithline patent. Id. at 1023. Apotex's ANDA further stated that its
product would not infringe that patent. Id.
58 Id. at 1013.
5 Id. at 1013-14, 1019-20.
60 Id. at 1019.
61 Id. at 1024-25.
62 Id. at 1025.
63 Id. at 1022-23.
64 Id. at 1025.
6 Id. (noting "the uncertainties in the scientific community concerning the provenance and
causality of polymorphs.").
66 Id. at 1026-29.
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valid, but not infringed, by Apotex's method for producing PHC anhydrate. 67

II. DISCUSSION

Improper Application of the Inherent Anticipation Doctrine in SmithKline
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court's claim construction, but
ultimately invalidated the SmithKline patent because it was inherently anticipated
by the Ferrosan patent. 68 This was improper for two reasons. First, the court
misconstrued the record and the district court's holding in finding the SmithKline
patent anticipated. Second, the Federal Circuit's holding does not comport with
precedent when the facts are properly interpreted.

A. The FederalCircuit erredin reversingthe districtcourt's finding that the
Ferrosanpatent did not anticipate the SmithKline patent.
An issued patent enjoys a presumption of validity which can only be rebutted by
clear and convincing evidence. 69 Prior art anticipates a chemical structure only when
it enables one skilled in the art to produce the identical structure. 70 Therefore, clear
and convincing evidence must show that the Ferrosan patent hy itself enabled a
skilled practitioner to make hemihydrate in order to find anticipation. The Federal
Circuit misconstrued SmithKline's infringement claim and misinterpreted the
teachings of the Ferrosan patent, causing it to mistakenly find the district court's
conclusion clearly erroneous.

1. Manufacture ofPHCis not the same as practicingthe Ferrosanpatent.
SmithKline's argument that manufacture of PHC would inevitably lead to
hemihydrate production formed a main foundation of the Federal Circuit's ruling.
67

Id. at 1052.

SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d. 1331, 1342-46 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(stating that "SmithKline admits, through its proffered arguments, that producing PHC anhydrate
according to the [Ferrosan] patent inevitably results in the production of at least trace amounts of
anticipating PHC hemihydrate").
69 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (stating that '[a] patent shall be presumed valid [and] ...
the
burden of establishing invalidity . . . shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity"); Radio Corp.
of Am. v. Radio Eng'r Lab., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 8 (1934) (noting that "one ... who assails the validity of
a patent fair upon its face bears a heavy burden of persuasion, and fails unless his evidence has
more than a dubious preponderance"); Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 995
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (requiring clear and convincing evidence to establish anticipation).
70 See SmithKline, 403 F.3d at 1342 (noting that anticipation requires each and every
limitation to be disclosed in a single prior art reference); Novo Nordisk Pharm. Inc., v. Biotechnology Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d 1347, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (reasoning that anticipation requires
that the inherently disclosed feature be enabled to one of skill in the art); Rasmusson v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (reasoning that "a patent claim 'cannot be
anticipated by a prior art reference if the allegedly anticipatory disclosures cited as prior art are not
enabled').
68
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The court reasoned that SmithKline "[admitted], through its proffered arguments,
that producing PHC anhydrate according to the [Ferrosan patent] inevitably results
in production ...of anticipating PHC hemihydrate." 71 This rationale misinterprets
SmithKline's core argument.
A claim is inherently anticipated only when it literally reads on something that
is a necessary consequence of practicing a prior art reference. 72 SmithKline argued
that its patent was infringed by manufacture of PHC anhydrate products, but that
73
the Ferrosan patent did not anticipate it.
They hypothesized that manufacture of
anhydrate products would cause the production facilities to become seeded with
74
hemihydrate, which would then make production of pure anhydrate impossible.
The distinction between "practice of the Ferrosan patent" and "manufacture of
75
anhydrate products" is crucial to the question of inherent anticipation.
First, it is questionable whether production of PHC is indeed practice of the
Ferrosan patent. The district court merely noted that production of hemihydrate was
first observed "while following more or less the directions of the patent."7 6 However,
the Ferrosan patent does not explicitly disclose either PHC or a method aimed at
producing PHC. Rather, the Ferrosan patent claims "[paroxetine] ...and a salt
thereof with a pharmaceutically acceptable acid" and discloses a general method for
producing a single paroxetine salt.77 This presents two problems. First, the patent
discloses, at the most, a genus of paroxetine salts, of which PHC is a species. The
problem is that a genus does not necessarily anticipate every species that falls within
it.78
Therefore, before the court could even get to the question of whether
hemihydrate was anticipated by the Ferrosan patent, it first needed to address
whether PHC, as a species of paroxetine salts, was disclosed by the Ferrosan patent.
This question was never addressed by either court. Second, one cannot logically
practice a patent on a chemical structure unless there is a procedure for producing it.
If anticipation of a product is analogous with practicing prior art, then the prior art
must enable production of the structure without undue experimentation.79 As noted
71SmithKline,

403 F.3d at 1344.

See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
73Smithline, 403 F.3d at 1341.
71Smithline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d. 1011, 1019 (N.D. Ill. 2003);
SmithKline, 403 F.3d at 1335-36 (noting that "to show that manufacture of PHC anhydrate tablets
necessarily creates PHC hemihydrate, SmithKline proffered expert testimony on the so-called
'seeding' or 'disappearing polymorph' theory").
75 SmithKline, 247 F. Supp. 2d. at 1019. As the district court points out, the issue is that
manufacture of pure anhydrate would be difficult or impossible. Id. Moreover, Judge Gajarsa
pointed out that both SmithKline and the district court explicitly rejected the idea that anhydrate
and hemihydrate always exist together and that SmithKline's scientists were "absolutely convinced"
that hemihydrate was not produced "before December 1984." SmithKline, 403 F.3d at 1355-56
(Gajarsa, J. concurring).
76SmithKline, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1025 (emphasis added).
77 See U.S. Patent No. 4,007,196 (filed July 23, 1975) (claim 1 and example 2).
Example 2
demonstrates a general method for making paroxetine maleate salts. Id.; see also SmithKIine, 247
F. Supp. 2d. at 1015 (noting that "the patent specified paroxetine maleate as the paroxetine salt it
was claiming"); U.S. Patent No. 4,721,723 (filed Oct. 23, 1986) (issued Jan. 26 1988) (citing Example
2 of the Ferrosan patent as an example of making paroxetine salts).
78 Atofino v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 7180, *20-21 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
7)Novo Nordisk Pharm. Inc., v. Bio-technology Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
72

2005).
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by the district court, the patent discloses "more or less" a procedure for producing
PHC. This is a problem, however, because the court also noted that Ferrosan
encountered "some travail" in producing PHC.80 Importantly, the district court never
addressed whether this difficulty amounted to undue experimentation. Although it is
possible, and maybe even likely, that the court would have found that PHC was both
disclosed and enabled by the Ferrosan patent, its failure to do so imparts doubt on
the propriety of the Federal Circuit's holding.
Even assuming that the Ferrosan patent disclosed and enabled PHC production,
manufacture of anhydrate products is not the same as practicing the Ferrosan
patent. Even in its broadest sense, practicing the Ferrosan patent ends with the
production of paroxetine salts. Manufacture of anhydrate products can involve steps
beyond production of PHC, including high-pressure treatment to form pills and a
final treatment with a water-based coating. 81 Furthermore, temperature and
humidity fluctuations during manufacture and storage present limitations outside
the bounds of the Ferrosan patent that could influence structural changes. 82 Finally,
SmithKline argued that Apotex's production facilities were already seeded with
hemihydrate from actively producing it for Hatch-Waxman purposes. 83 This is
precisely the point; SmithKline's argument is that Apotex cannot possibly have a
pure anhydrate product because use of PHC under these eireumstances will
inevitably result in hemihydrate production. These conditions simply do not read
84
upon anything in the Ferrosan patent.
The only way to reconcile the Federal Circuit's holding is to presume that a
structural patent inherently contains the right to manufacture all commercial
embodiments of the claimed product, which then passes to the public upon
expiration. In this case, the Ferrosan patent must be construed to include all
products that contain paroxetine salts. However, it is dogmatic that, while a patent
contains the right to exclude others from using the claimed structure, it does not
guarantee an absolute right to use the structure.8 5 As noted in the Federal Circuit's
concurring opinion, the right to use is traditionally limited to those means that are
reasonably disclosed by the patent.8 6 It logically follows that the benefit to the public
80 SmithUine, 247 F. Supp. 2d. at 1015.
SI Id.at 1024, 1034, 1039, 1043-44.

82 Id.at 1024.
83 d

81See generallyU.S. Patent No. 4,007,196 (filed July 23, 1975).
85 JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 14 (Aspen 2003) (noting that "a
patent does not convey any positive or affirmative right to make use sell, offer to sell, or import an

invention"). For example, assume that inventor A invents a straight back chair and obtains a broad
patent covering chairs. Id. at 15.

Inventor B subsequently invents a rocking chair. Id.

Inventor B

cannot make, use, or sell his rocking chair because it literally infringes A's patent. Id. Likewise, A
cannot make sell or use a rocking chair because B has the right to exclude others from using it.

Id.

86 Smithline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Gajarsa,
J., concurring). Judge Gajarsa noted that:
[w]hoever discovers that a certain useful result will be produced ...by the use of
certain means, is entitled to a patent for it;provided he specifies the means he
uses in a manner so full and exact, that any one skilled in the science . . . can, by
using the means he specifies, without any addition to, or subtraction from them,
produce precisely the result he describes. And if this cannot be done by the means
he describes, the patent is void. And if it can be done, then the patent confers on
him the exclusive right to use the means he specifies to produce the result or
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is limited to those means. The embodiment of PHC anhydrate and the means to
produce it that SmithKline claims will infringe its patent simply are not disclosed,
reasonably or otherwise, by the Ferrosan patent. SmithKline's arguments therefore
do not admit that practice of the Ferrosan patent inevitably leads to production of
PHC hemihydrate.

2. The facts as found by the districtcourt were not clearly erroneous.
Without such an admission, Apotex needed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that hemihydrate is a necessary consequence of practicing the Ferrosan
patent.8 7
Hemihydrate production was observed only in two situations: (1)
SmithKline's experiments with the procedures outlined by Ferrosan and (2) a few
batches of PHC produced by SmithKline which contained hemihydrate.88 The district
court found this evidence insufficient to meet this burden.8 9 To the Federal Circuit,
however, this indicated that the Ferrosan patent inherently anticipated the
SmithKline patent, rendering it invalid. 90 The Federal Circuit was unwarranted in
reversing this finding of fact as clearly erroneous. 91
The Federal Circuit misinterpreted the district court's holding. It read the
decision as requiring Apotex to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
hemihydrate existed before SmithKline discovered it.92 While this was certainly an
aspect of the holding, it is not the entire case. The district court was also
unconvinced that Apotex had shown by clear and convincing evidence that
hemihydrate is produced by following the Ferrosan patent in a non-seeded
environment. 93 Apotex's expert posited that, under the Ferrosan specifications,
hemihydrate exists in equilibrium with anhydrate, although at undetectable levels,
while SmithKline's expert asserted that he was 'absolutely convinced' that no
hemihydrate had existed before December of 1984." 9 4 The district court thought it
likely that hemihydrate seeds are present in any batch of anhydrate, but nonetheless
found it possible that pure anhydrate could be produced in a non-seeded
effect he describes, and nothing more.
Id. (quoting O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853)).
87 See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
88 Smithline, 403 F.3d at 1344.
89 SmithKline, 247 F. Supp. 2d. at 1025-26.
90 SmithKline, 403 F.3d at 1347. The court found that SmithKline's "serendipitous" discovery
of hemihydrate meant that anhydrate could spontaneously convert to hemihydrate. Id. at 1344.
91Novo Nordisk Pharm. Inc., v. Bio-technology Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (noting that "[w]hat a prior art reference discloses in an anticipation analysis is a factual
determination that we review under the clearly erroneous standard"); Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex,
Inc., 376 F.3d 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that "a finding is clearly erroneous when, despite
some supporting evidence, 'the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."').
92 SmithKline, 403 F.3d at 1343 (interpreting the district court decision as requiring Apotex to
prove, "by clear and convincing evidence that it was impossible to make pure PHC anhydrate in the
United States before the critical date of the [SmithKline] patent").
93 SmithKline, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1026. Particularly, the district court was swayed by "the
uncertainties in the scientific community concerning the provenance and causality of polymorphs ...
Id. at 1025.
94 Id. at 1022.
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environment. 95 Therefore, Apotex failed to meet its burden of proof.
This is a critical holding because the presence of seeds presents an extra
limitation not described in the Ferrosan patent. Neither party presented evidence
clearly showing that practice of the Ferrosan patent leads directly to formation of
hemihydrate seeds. 96 SmithKline's experiments with the Ferrosan patent provided
the only direct mechanisms for hemihydrate formation. 97 However, this does not
mean that the Ferrosan patent anticipates seed formation, because at least one
condition of this procedure was not taught by the Ferrosan patent.98 Hemihydrate
was subsequently observed every time SmithKline attempted to make anhydrate in
the lab; however, this can be explained by seeds left from SmithKline's previous
production of hemihydrate. 99 Therefore, SmithKline's experimental observation of
hemihydrate conclusively was not anticipatory. The only other veritable observation
of hemihydrate came while testing two batches manufactured prior to SmithKline's
discovery of hemihydrate. 10 0 However, those samples were tested three months after
they were made. 10 1 Without understanding what happened in those three months,
one can only speculate as to the source of the hemihydrate.10 2 For all anyone knows,
those batches were pure anhydrate until they were seeded by the very scientists
responsible for verifying their purity. The district court noted that someone carrying
even trace amounts of hemihydrate on their clothing could seed anhydrate,
converting it to hemihydrate. 10 3 The Ferrosan patent does not contemplate such an
additional treatment of the end-product.
In such a situation, hemihydrate
production is not anticipated because it occurs as a result of a condition outside the
purview of the Ferrosan patent.
Taken as a whole, the district court did not find these facts to clearly show that
production of hemihydrate seeds naturally flows from practice of the Ferrosan

95 Id.

at 1023, 1026.

The district court also reasoned that "inherent anticipation may not be

established by probabilities or possibilities." Id. at 1025 (citing MEHL/Biophile Int'l Corp. v.
Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
96 See SmithKline, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1019-23.
97 Id. at 1017 (noting that when hemihydrate was first observed, SmithKline's scientist had
"made a batch of paroxetine, added isopropyl alcohol, ...
and found that the batch crystallized as
hemihydrate instead of anhydrate"); see also U.S. Patent No. 4,721,723 (filed Oct. 23, 1986) (issued
Jan. 26 1988).
98 See goenerally U.S. Patent No. 4,007,196 (filed July 23, 1975). Example 2 demonstrates a
general method of paroxetine crystal formation whereby the chemical is crystallized initially in an
ether solution, resuspended in ethanol, and then recrystallized. Id. Addition of isopropyl alcohol
constitutes an additional limitation not found in the Ferrosan patent. See Sm tlKline, 247 F. Supp.

2d. at 1017; U.S. Patent No. 4,721,723 (filed Oct. 23, 1986) (issued Jan. 26 1988) (reciting several
methods for production of crystalline paroxetine hemihydrate distinguishable from those in the
Ferrosan patent).
99 SmithKline, 247 F. Supp. 2d. at 1021.
The district court accepted that seeding was
responsible for subsequent laboratory produced hemihydrate, noting that "the likeliest explanation
is that the first batch of hemihydrate that he created had seeded his lab." Id.
100 Id. at 1022.
101 Id. at 1016, 1022 (noting that Smith~line's scientist discovered hemihydrate in March of
1985 and batches produced in December of 1984 and January of 1985 were subsequently tested and
determined to contain hemihydrate).
102 Id. at 1022 (characterizing Apotex's assertion that hemihydrate and anhydrate exist in
equilibrium as conjecture "support[ed] ... in SmithKline's own evidence").
103 Id.
at 1020-21.
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patent. 10 4 The district court noted that, "[it is equally plausible ... that practicing
the [Ferrosan] patent in a non-seeded premises ... would not have produced any
hemihydrate." 10 5 This conclusion is supported by substantial evidence, therefore
rendering the Federal Circuit's reversal unwarranted.106

B. The FederalCircuit'sruling over-extends the reach of inherent anticipation.
The extent to which the Federal Circuit has broadened the inherent anticipation
doctrine presents an even more troubling problem than the impropriety of reversing
the district court. First, the Federal Circuit essentially held that a by-product of a
chemical reaction not directly taught by the patent was anticipated by the mere fact
that the reaction was intended to produce a claimed structure. Second, the court
held that such anticipation could be established solely upon a theoretical base even
when faced with an equally plausible counter-theory, which is inconsistent with

precedent.

1. SmithKline held that a chemical by-product of an undeseribedchemical reaction is
antieipated.
The first and most obvious point of error by both courts is that PHC is never
explicitly described in the patent. 10 7 The Ferrosan patent claimed a class of
molecules that includes paroxetine and "a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof'
and only disclosed a method for making paroxetine maleate.10 8
The claim of
pharmaceutically acceptable salts is a genus claim, which does not necessarily
encompass all members of the genus. 10 9 At best, such a genus could only generically
anticipate PHC, but could not anticipate specific crystalline forms of PHC.110
101See id. at 1025-26. Even though the opposite is likewise not clearly demonstrated, the
district court pointed out that the burden upon the party challenging the validity of the patent is
heavy. id. The weight of the evidnen failed to carry this burden. d. at 1026.
105 Id. at 1026.
106 SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1328, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Newman,
J., dissenting) (denying rehearing en bane) (noting that the majority's "findings of chemical fact are
devoid of scientific support"); see also Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985)
(noting that "if the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in the light of the record
viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced . . . it would
have weighed the evidence differently."); Miles Lab. Inc. v. Shandon, Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 874 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (noting that "[w]here the fact-finder's account of the evidence ... chooses one of two
permissible views of the evidence, it has committed no clear error.").
107 See SmithKline, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1024 (noting that '[the Ferrosan patent] did not refer to
paroxetine hydrochloride or to crystallinity, but to a set of compounds of which paroxetine maleate
(another paroxetine salt) was one example.").
108 U.S. Patent No. 4,007,196 (filed July 23, 1975).
10 9
Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 7180, at *20-21 (Fed. Cir. Mar.
23, 2006) (noting that, unless a genus claim is narrow, it does not necessarily anticipate every
species); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that
"[w]here there is unpredictability in performance of certain species ... other than those specifically
enumerated, one skilled in the art may be found not to have ... a genus.").
110 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1024. The court noted
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Even assuming that PHC anhydrate was a claimed end product, each of the
processes that definitively led to hemihydrate production involved steps that were
not contemplated by the Ferrosan patent.11 1 Furthermore, the intended end product
of each of these processes was anhydrate, not hemihydrate.
Given this, the
hemihydrate that was produced could be deemed a by-product of uncontemplated
methods of producing a claimed end product. The crux of the issue is that different
methods for producing the same intended end-product will often result in a distinct
array of by-products. The question is whether a structure patent anticipates byproducts of production methods that are distinct from what was disclosed. This
proposition does not logically comport with precedent.
Anticipation requires that every limitation of the anticipated subject matter be
contained within a single prior art reference. 112 Something simply is not contained
within a prior art reference if one must go outside of that reference to produce it.
Moreover, prior art inherently anticipates only those things which are necessary
consequences of what was disclosed. 113 Again, something cannot be a necessary
consequence when it only appears under certain conditions beyond the teachings of
the prior art. There are simply too many steps required to get from the Ferrosan
patent to hemihydrate in order to justify ruling that it contains every limitation of
the SmithKline patent.

2. Neither Supreme Courtnor FederalCircuitprecedent supports anticipationof
chemical by-products by undeseribedchemicalreaetions.
Neither the structure of PHC hemihydrate nor the methods for producing it
were disclosed by the Ferrosan patent. Well-established Supreme Court precedent
holds that even slight variance between the assaulted subject matter and prior art
defeats anticipation. 114 In Eibel Process, the Supreme Court unambiguously held
that a claim is unanticipated even when every element of the prior art is present if
they are put together in a distinct fashion. 115 Every instance in which hemihydrate
was produced involved fashions of producing PHC anhydrate that are measurably
distinct from those taught in the Ferrosan patent. Furthermore, Tilghman v. Procter
explicitly rejected the argument that accidental and unwitting production of byproducts in pursuit of other and different results is the same as anticipation. 116 PHC
that SmithKline was able to patent other forms of anhydrate. Id. This indicates that the disclosure
of the genus itself was insufficient to prevent the patentability of PHC anhydrate. Moreover, the
court observed that the example of paroxetine maleate probably yielded an amorphous salt, which
means that it was not crystalline. Id.
This could be construed to indicate that significant
experimentation would have been required to produce any crystalline structure, which would
preclude anticipation of crystalline species.
111 Compare U.S. Patent No. 4,007,196 (filed July 23, 1975) (Example 2), with U.S. Patent No.
4,721,723 (filed Oct. 23, 1986) (issued Jan. 26 1988).
112 See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
113 Id.
114 SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1328, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(denying rehearing en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707
(1881) and Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 67 (1923)).
115 EibalProeess,261 U.S. at 67.
116 Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 711-12 (noting that there is no anticipation of "accidentally and
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hemihydrate was produced as an accidental and unwitting by-product of an attempt
to produce PHC anhydrate that was not described by the Ferrosan patent. Both
cases are still good law and defeat any precedential basis for the Federal Circuit's
holding.
One can also distinguish this case from Federal Circuit precedent. Much of the
court's decision was based on the teachings of Sohering and Atlas Powder.117 Both
cases involved claimed elements that were necessary for the prior art to function as
intended. 118 Moreover, those anticipated by-products were invariably present when
the intended result was obtained as described. 119
In contrast, hemihydrate
120
production was an ancillary consequence of an alternate method of production.
Further, the district court found that it was reasonably possible to produce
anhydrate in some settings without producing hemihydrate.1 21 This sufficiently
distinguishes SmithKline from Sobering and Atlas Powder to avoid them as
precedent.
The Federal Circuit also incorrectly distinguished this case from In re Seaborg.
In re Seaborg held that a radioisotope was not anticipated by a prior art nuclear
reaction because there was no "positive evidence" that the isotope was actually
produced. 122 If anything, this case is directly on point. In both cases, anticipation
unwittingly produced" results).
117 SmithKline, 403 F.3d at 1343-46.
118 Atlas Powdui; 190 F.3d at 1347 (noting that a claim for "sufficient aeration" is anticipated
when "[t]he trial record ... shows that those of ordinary skill in this art at the time ... knew that
both interstitial and porous air enhance sensitivity."); Schering 339 F.3d. at 1381 (holding that the
a metabolite of a claimed product was anticipated).
119 Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 534, 538 (D.N.J. 2002) (noting that
the plaintiff consistently called the anticipated product "the major active circulating metabolite" of
the anticipatory subject matter, which means that the anticipatory subject matter could not function
as intended without forming that metabolite); Atlas Powder, 190 F.3d at 1344-45 (noting that
sufficient aeration-which was the only distinguishing limitation between the claim in question and
the prior art-was a critical element in the increased efficacy of prior art explosives as compared to
others available at the time, therefore rendering that limitation inherent in the prior art).
120 See Smithline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d. 1011, 1022 (N.D. Ill.
2003).
121

Id. at 1026.

122

In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996, 999 (C.C.P.A. 1964). The court noted that:

[In order for a] patent or other publication to be an anticipation [it] must bear
within its four corners adequate directions for the practice of the patent
invalidated. If the earlier disclosure offers no more than a starting point for
further experiments, if its teaching will sometimes succeed and sometimes fail, if
it does not inform the art without more how to practice the new invention, it has
not correspondingly enriched the store of common knowledge, and it is not an
anticipation.
Id. at 997. In addition, the court stated:
There is no positive evidence that americium was produced inherently in the
natural uranium fuel ... in the exemplary statement relied upon by the Patent
Office. ...
The maximum amount of americium-241 which could have been
produced by the operation of the reactor ... would have been one billionth of one
gram (1/i1,000,000,000 gram). . . . If the one billionth of a gram were produced, it
would have been completely undetectable, since it would have been diluted with
the 40 tons of intensely radioactive uranium fuel which made up the reactor. The
possibility that although a minute amount of americium may have been produced
in the Fermi reactor, it was not identified (nor could it have been identified,(sic)
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was inferred from a scientific theory. 123 In neither case was there any evidence
shown that the anticipated molecules were actually being produced by the methods
as described in the prior art. 124 Under In re Seaborg, a scientific theory cannot
substitute for evidence showing production of hemihydrate flowing directly from
practice of the Ferrosan patent. 125 Because Apotex could not produce such evidence,
In re Seaborgrequiredthe court to reject the anticipation defense.
Finally, the court failed to distinguish this case from Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm,
Ltd.126 In that case, the Federal Circuit affirmed a finding of non-anticipation of a
novel crystalline form of an anti-ulcer drug. 127 The party asserting anticipation was
able to definitively demonstrate that a crystallization procedure outlined in a prior
art patent led directly to production of the claimed crystal. 128 However, the district
court found non-infringement because the prior art form of the crystal could also be
made by the procedure. 129 The Federal Circuit affirmed. 130 As the Federal Circuit
explained in In re Crish, this holding was proper because the facts indicate that the
claimed form of the crystal was not always made by the procedure outlined in the
prior art patent. 13 1 Similarly here, the district court concluded that, although it is
likely that hemihydrate is produced in trace amounts whenever anhydrate is made,
this was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. 132 The finding of nonanticipation based on this finding of fact is clearly supported by Glaxo and Crish and
should have been affirmed.

III. PROPOSAL
So What Is the Alternative? Applying Obviousness to Remedy the Flaws of
SmithKline.
Despite the legal flaws, it is difficult to argue with the outcome of SmithKline
from an equity standpoint. Neither logic nor equity supports precluding practice of
would preclude the application of the Fermi patent as a reference to anticipate the
present invention.

Id. at 999. In short, this means that even though the party asserting anticipation proved with a fair
degree of scientific precision that the alleged product was present in the prior art, this evidence was
insufficient to establish inherency because there was no positive evidence emanating from the
practiceof the priorartto establish this theory.
123 Compare id. at 998 (rejecting inherent anticipation because "its determination [in this case]
is dependent to such a great extent upon inferences rather than upon definitely established facts"),

with SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1335, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(finding inherent anticipation despite the fact that the movant did not show that practice of prior art

directly leads to production of the anticipated subject matter).
121 In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d at 998; SmithKline, 403 F.3d at 1335, 1344-45.
125 See In -reSeaborg, 328 F.2d 993, 994 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
126 See generally,Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
127Id. at 1045, 1047-48.
128 Id. at 1047.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 1048.
131 In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
132 SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d. 1011, 1022-23, 1026 (N.D. Ill.
2003).
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an expired patent on the theory that it infringes a subsequent patent. However, the
inherent anticipation doctrine as applied in SmithKline could prove fatal to many
chemical and biological structural patents. 133 First, the pitfalls of this doctrine will
be discussed.
Then, an alternate rubric for analyzing such situations will be
addressed.

A.

The Federal Circuit'scurrent inherency doctrine couldpreclude patentingof
useful chemical and biologicalstructures.

PHC and other crystal structures are examples of macromolecules, a class of
very large molecules composed of smaller subunits, which includes proteins, DNA,
and polymers. Although macromolecular variability is most obvious when the
chemical composition is changed, any macromolecule can exist in a multitude of
three-dimensional structures. 13 4 These different structures often impart distinct
physical, functional, and even pathological characteristics on the molecule. 135 The
identification, production, and utilization of novel three-dimensional macromolecular
structures has already proven to be fertile ground for advancement in the chemical,
13 6
pharmaceutical, biotechnological, and nanotechnological arts.
Under SmithKline, a competitor could invalidate patents on such structures
merely by devising a scientifically plausible theory explaining the structure's
undetected presence within the prior art. For example, various types of DNA
structures have been observed in vitro.13 7 Assume that a scientist, while attempting
to increase the yield of one of these structures, alters the concentration of one reagent
in a previously described protocol. As a result, she discovers a novel structure that
unexpectedly proves useful in developing an AIDS vaccine. She applies for and
3:3SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1328, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (listing specific classes of chemicals that will become unpatentable as a
result of SmithKline).
131
Piero A. Temussi, Laura Masino, & Annalisa Pastore, From Alzheimer to Huntington: why
is a structuralunderstandingso difficult?, 22 EMBO J. 355, 355 (2003) (noting that "the 'one gene,
one protein, one function' hypothesis has by now been contradicted more often than confirmed" in
respect to genetic disorders and that neurodegenerative diseases are characterized by protein
"misfolding" events); G. Bitan et. al., Neurotoxic Protein Oligomers-What You See Is Not Always
What You Get., 12 AMYLOID 88, 88-95 (2005). For example, the beta-amyloid protein can exist as a
monomer or can self-associate to form globular and fibrillar quaternary structures, depending on a
variety of factors. Id. at 88-92.
135 See generally C. Hetz & C. Soto, Protein ML;folding and Disease: The Case of Prion
Disorders,60 CELL. MOL. LIFE SC. 133 (2003) (noting that the only difference between the normal
protein and a pathogenic prion is a "misfolding" event that induces a different three-dimensional
structure to the prion).
136 See generally William L. Klein, Abeta toxicity in Alzheimer's disease: globular oligomers
(ADDLs) as new vaccine and drug targets, 41 NEUROCHEMISTRY INT'L 345 (2002) (demonstrating the
disparate pathological characteristics of three different three-dimensional forms of a protein
implicated in Alzheimer's Disease and discussing the potential of one of these forms as a drug
target); Amanda J. Haes, Lei Chang, William Klein, & Richard Van Duyne, Detection ofa biomarker
for Alzheimer's disease from synthetic and clinicalsamples using a nanoscale optical biosensor 127
J. AM. CHEM. SOC'Y 2263 (2005) (demonstrating use of a novel three-dimensional structure of A6 as a
diagnostic tool for Alzheimer's Disease).
137 See JEREMY M. BERG, ET. AL.,

III BIOCHEMISTRY §27 (W.H. FREEMAN, 5TH ED. 2002);

available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/bv.fcgi?rid=stryer.section.3847.
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obtains a patent on this structure. A competitor then asserts that the structure was
a necessary, but immeasurable, result of the prior art protocol, explaining that an
equilibrium existed between the structures that was dependant on the concentration
of that reagent. Such a theory would be sufficient to prove the novel structure was
138
anticipated under a strict factual comparison to SmithK]ine.
In the hypothetical, the general mechanism of a prior art reaction was being
followed, but with a slight modification. Similarly, the hemihydrate that was first
observed in SmithKline arose from a slight change in a prior art protocol. 13 9 The
hypothetical actually presents a less radical situation because the only modification
concerns the concentrations of a single reagent, whereas in SmithKline, a completely
different reagent was involved. As the new DNA form in the hypothetical arose from
a reaction more similar to the prior art than the reaction leading to hemihydrate
production, SmithKine would counsel that the new DNA form was inherently
anticipated.
The problem with SmithKline's rubric is that it allows a court to infer the
results of a chemical reaction from those of a closely related, but distinct, reaction.
However, what is and is not produced as a result of a chemical reaction is often
dependant on every limitation of that reaction. Even the slightest change can
significantly alter the outcome. To say that a single method for producing a certain
end-product anticipates everything that results from every production method is
scientifically untenable and does not comport with prior precedent.140
Perhaps the SmithKline court was motivated by an interest in stemming the
tide of similar infringement cases. It is worth noting that both SmithKline and
Sehering originated as infringement actions against generic drug manufacturers
attempting to practice prior art. 141 Moreover, at the time of trial, the Federal Trade
Commission was investigating whether follow-up patents were being used by
pharmaceutical companies to unfairly compete with generic companies.14 2 This is
rough justice strongly in favor of the broadest public use of patented technology after
the patent term ends, regardless of the motivation. The majority rationalized this
course by suggesting alternatives to the structural claim that would not be precluded
from patent protection, such as "substantially pure" forms, process claims, or
pharmaceutical compositions. 143 This does not solve the problem, as the usefulness
138

See generally Smithlmine Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d. 1011 (N.D. Ill.

2003).
1:39Compare id. at 1017 (noting that hemihydrate was observed when isopropanol was used as
a solvent), with U.S. Patent No. 4,007,196 (filed July 23, 1975) (Example 2) (using ether and 99%

ethanol-ether as solvent).
110 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1328, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en

banc) (Newman, J., dissenting) (noting that inherent anticipation relates only to "situations where
the common knowledge of technologists is not recorded in the reference" and that '[the majority's]
findings of chemical fact . . . are devoid of scientific support") (citation omitted); In -reFisher, 427
F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (noting that most chemical reactions are unpredictable and therefore
the extent to which a certain reaction enables should be considered narrowly).
MISee generally SmithKline, 247 F. Supp. 2d. 1011; Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., 339
F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
142 SmithKline, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1024.
143 SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Schering
339 F.3d at 1381 (stating that patentees may still benefit from their discoveries through method
claims, claims for the substantially pure form of the subject matter, and claims for pharmaceutical
compositions).
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and importance of a chemical discovery is not always realized by packaging it into a
pill or concentrating it because the structure itself may have properties unrelated to
the use contemplated by the discoverer. For example, benzene is a common organic
solvent.14 4 However, benzene is also commonly used as a precursor for other
chemicals.14 5
Suppose, arguendo, that someone invented benzene while
experimenting with prior art reactions as in SmithK]ine. He acquires a patent on
benzene, knowing only that it can be used as a solvent. If he is restricted to the types
of claims outlined in Sobering, others will be free to use it as starting material to
make other new and useful products if they can do so without using substantially
pure benzene or can develop alternate mechanisms for making it.146 In essence, this
invites competitors to freely experiment with the structure and obtain their own
patents relating to the uses. This inequitably limits the inventor's right to exclude
others from capitalizing on his innovation.

B. What is a court to do? Limiting the scope ofinherent anticipationby using§ 103
to analyze whether a chemical by-product ofproducingof a claimed endproduct is
patentable.
This leaves us where we started. SmithKline's intent in filing both the patent
and the infringement suit was clear: they wanted to be the exclusive marketer of a
hugely profitable drug. 147 Their discovery contributed nothing to the efficacy of the
drug, but did make it easier to manufacture.148 By a quirk of chemistry, the prior art
form of the drug cannot be manufactured in the preferred pharmaceutical
embodiment without, at some point, infringing SmithKline's patent. 149 Therefore,
SmithKline can presumably prevent anyone from manufacturing it even though the
actual drug predates SmithKline's patent. This does not, and should not, feel right.
However, an alternate analytical framework could avoid some of the most serious
problems.
First, a chemical structure should only be anticipated when it arises as a direct
result of an explicitly described prior art reaction. As a corollary to that, any
alteration of a prior art reaction intended to produce a prior art molecule should
preclude finding anticipation of other chemical structures produced as a result.
These principles should insert more certainty into anticipation by more specifically
defining anticipatory sources. Moreover, this narrow interpretation of anticipation
more delicately balances protection of public knowledge with protection of novel ideas
by restricting anticipation to the real anticipatory source: the chemical reaction.
After all, prior art chemical structures themselves do little to inform the public of the
existence of alternate structures or enable the public to make them. It is the reaction
that both informs and enables.
144 2 NEw ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 115 (Robert P. Gwinn, et. al., eds., 15th ed. 1992).

Id.
See Schering Corp., 339 F.3d at 1381.
147 See Aaron Smith, Now profit twist for cirugmakeors, CNNMoney.com, (May 11, 2005),
http://money.cnn.com/2005/05/1ll/news/fortune5OO/generic/(last visited Apr. 1, 2006); SmithKline,
247 F. Supp 2d. at 1017.
148 SmithKline, 247 F. Supp 2d. at 1017.
149
Id. at 1019-21.
H5
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Second, chemical structures that are by-products of undisclosed reactions should
be patentable unless they are obvious.
The anticipation doctrine applied in
SmithKline renders any chemical structure related to a prior art reaction
unpatentable, regardless of the predictability or utility of the structure. In contrast,
obviousness predicates invalidity on the predictability of conceiving of the structure
and the properties entailed by such a structure. 150 This presents a more equitable
invalidity analysis because it differentiates between truly novel discoveries and
pseudo best modes. The best way to illustrate the point is to consider how
SmithKline and the DNA example would be treated under § 103.
Even though the district court found that the SmithKline patent was nonobvious, there is a reasonable argument that PHC hemihydrate was obvious in light
of the Ferrosan patent. Claim interpretation and comparison is relatively easy. The
SmithKline
patent is quite
clear,
claiming
"paroxetine
hydrochloride
hemihydrate." 151 The Ferrosan patent disclosed the broad class of pharmaceutically
acceptable paroxetine salts. 152 The only specific example provided was a paroxetine
maleate salt. 153 Therefore, the SmithKline patent and the Ferrosan patent differed
only in the specificity of the salt claimed. The identity of hemihydrate is obvious
simply by the disclosure of pharmaceutically acceptable salts of paroxetine. As a
general proposition, a chemical structure is obvious when the identity and benefits of
it would be known to a person of ordinary skill in the art. 154 The district court noted
that pharmaceutical producers prefer hydrochloride salts. 155 This means that PHC
generically is obvious. 156 Given the general knowledge that crystals can exist in
multiple arrangements and that PHC made according to the Ferrosan patent had an
affinity for water, an ordinarily skilled crystal chemist would conclude that PHC
could exist in a hydrated form. 157 Therefore, the Ferrosan patent fairly suggests the
existence of hemihydrate. 158 The benefits of hemihydrate would likewise be obvious.
The problem addressed by addition of water is one of handling; anhydrate did not
handle well in the pill making process because of its hygroscopicity. 159 Hemihydrate
solved this problem because it is not hygroscopic. 160 As the district court pointed out,

150 DeMaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(holding that a wildly successful, but simple, improvement over prior art was not obvious because
the commercial success was evidence that the difference had unexpected quality making it more
desirable); In -r Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 391 (1963) (holding that both the compound's chemical
composition and properties must be obvious in order to be make the structure non-patentable).
151 U.S. Patent No. 4,721,723 (filed Oct. 23, 1986).
152 U.S. Patent No. 4,007,196 (filed July 23, 1975).
153 Id. (Example 2).
154 In -reLintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 1016 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (holding that prima facie obviousness
requires that the reference teachings be sufficient to suggest the modification); DoMaco, 851 F.2d at
1393 (noting that commercial success must be due to properties separate from those disclosed by
prior art to prove nonobviousness).
155 SmithKline Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp 2d 1011, 1015 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
156 Id. at 1016. Because hydrochlorides are preferred, an ordinarily skilled practitioner would
likely devise PHC immediately upon hearing the words "pharmaceutically acceptable salts thereof."
157 Soo Id. at 1016-17.
158 See In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380, 383 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that "a reference must be
considered not only for what it expressly teaches, but also for what it fairly suggests").
159 SmithiKline, 247 F. Supp 2d at 1017.
160 Id.
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this property is not surprising as hemihydrate "has already drunk, as it were." 161
The fact that this property of hemihydrate was indeed predictable indicates that it is
obvious.
In contrast, the DNA hypothetical would not be obvious. Despite the fact that
the prior art disclosed a class of molecules related to it, nothing in the prior art
suggests that particular structure. Furthermore, nothing about the function of the
prior structures would allow one to predict its utility for treating AIDS. Given the
lack of predictability of structure or function, this structure is non-obvious and thus
should be patentable.

CONCLUSION

SmithK]ine rates fairly well as an equitable decision on the facts. SmithKline
still has a monopoly over one iteration of a commercially successful product, albeit
more restricted in scope than the one they wanted. Apotex, meanwhile, has the
opportunity to enter the market as a competitor. On the other hand, SmithKline is
woefully lacking as precedent. It has opened the door to invalidating too many truly
useful patents by allowing defendants to demonstrate anticipation by mere
possibility that a structure is present but undetectable in prior art. This cannot be
allowed to stand. The Supreme Court should grant certiorari and set clear limits to
the applicability of the inherent anticipation doctrine.
If SmithKline is vacated, then the Federal Circuit should adjust its analytical
rubric for similar cases. First, inherent anticipation should not apply if any amount
of experimentation is required to get from the prior art to the claimed subject matter.
In such cases, three-dimensional isoforms of the prior art molecule should be proven
obvious in light of the prior art before they can be deemed unpatentable. If these
steps are taken, the types of vexing problems presented by SmithKline can largely be
avoided.

161 Id. But see In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 683 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (finding non-obviousness
when "there is no evidence in the record of the instant case which would teach one of ordinary skill
in this art that the differences in molecular structure ... would cause this difference in properties").

